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MESSAGES FROM
STRASBOURG: LESSONS FOR
AMERICAN COURTS FROM THE
HIGHEST VOLUME HUMAN
RIGHTS COURT IN THE
WORLD-THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ALLEN E. SHOENBERGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2003, the United States Supreme Court rendered the
groundbreaking decision of Lawrence v. Texas,1 invalidating a Texas
statute which criminalized" 'deviate sexual intercourse' " as violative
of adults' due process and privacy interests. 2 Not only did Lawrence
overrule Bowers v. Hardwick,3 but also the opinion of the Court by
Justice Kennedy cited as persuasive precedent a decision by the
European Court of Human Rights, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.4 This
article focuses upon the latter citation, not for the particulars of the
citation, but in order to consider the following question: What other
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I wish to
thank Lindsay Morgan for her research assistance.
1. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. Id. at 563, 578.
3. Id. at 578.
4. Id. at 573. "Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of
Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the decision is at odds with the premise in
Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization." Id.
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precedents of the European Court of Human Rights are potential
persuasive precedents for American constitutional law? This article
explores this issue, after describing the European Court of Human
Rights, a Court which is now the most prolific supreme court in the
world deciding human rights cases as measured by the number of
decisions a year. The Court also issues opinions in a multitude of
official languages including English. Since its opinions are readily
available on the computer database operated by Lexis, as well as
through various web sites, the opinions of the European Court of
Human Rights are quite available to United States courts and lawyers.
Decisions by the European Court of Human Rights
5
1960-69: 10 cases
1970-79: 26
1980-89: 169
1990-99: 809
2000: 686
2001: 879
2002: 795
2003: 698
2004: 717
Indeed, as the table above indicates, the pace of decision making
by the Court has rapidly increased over the last decade and a half.
The European Court of Human Rights consists of judges
nominated by each member state, who for decision purposes normally
sit in one of four panels of seven judges.6 These judges sit in their
individual capacities and must be persons of "high moral character." 7
On special occasions for cases considered particularly important the
court sits in a Grand Chamber consisting of seventeen judges to hear
appeals from judgments of ordinary chambers. 8 The Court's decisions
5. See generally European Ct. of Human Rights,
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/ (last updated Sept. 26, 2005) (data provided
and owned by the European Court of Human Rights).
6. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and Explanatory Report pt. IV, Explanatory Report 29, 32-
33 (May 11, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 943.
7. Id. at 1, 21.
8. Id. at 36. In cases that raise a serious question affecting the interpretation or
Vol. 27
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are pretty routinely obeyed by the nation states that are members of the
Council of Europe. 9 Awards of money damages and court costs and
attorneys fees are relatively simple matters. Compliance with decisions
that require alteration of nation state's domestic law and/or procedural
changes take more time. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, a political body, monitors compliance with the Court's
decisions. 10  The Court, itself, does not monitor compliance with its
decisions, although it has conducted a study of compliance which
appears on its website.11
While the European Court of Human Rights is obviously not an
American court, it owes its origin in a very direct way to the United
States Bill of Rights. The essence of the Bill of Rights was
incorporated into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948.12
Subsequently the Council of Europe drafted the European Convention
application of the Convention or protocols thereto, or a serious issue of general
importance. Id. at 47.
9. "What is remarkable about the enforcement mechanisms of the European
Convention is that they work. The ECHR and the Commission have been noted for
their 'unrivaled [effectiveness] on the international plane.' " Joseph G. Bergen,
Student Author, Princz v. The Federal Republic of Germany: Why the Courts Should
Find That Violating Jus Cogen Norms Constitutes an Implied Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity, 14 Conn. J. Intl. L. 169, 193-94 (1999). Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of
Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 95, 152 (2003).
What makes the enforcement process for ECHR judgments so interesting is
that the court announces nearly one thousand judgments a year, often in high-
profile cases on which emotions run high, yet it has no remand mechanism at
its command. Nonetheless, there is a broad consensus that the level of
compliance with ECHR judgments is very high, even if compliance is not
always cheerfully and quietly carried out by the affected states.
John Cary Sims, Compliance Without Remands: The Experience Under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 639, 640 (2004).
10. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and Explanatory Report, supra n. 6, at 50.
11. The effects of judgments or cases from 1959-98, which describes the resulting
actions in over 300 cases. European Court of Human Rights,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/EffectsOfJudgments.html (accessed Dec. 19,
2005).
12. Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, International Human Rights: Problems of
Law, Policy, and Practice 7 (3d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1995). Its adoption owed
much to the activities of Eleanor Roosevelt who was the chairman of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights. The third session of the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the document without a dissenting vote. Her comments
about the document are frequently cited as authoritative. Id.
2005
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on Human Rights (Convention) in 1950 incorporating many of the
rights from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and giving
explicit credit to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its
preamble. 13
It should surprise few that the United States Supreme Court might
be interested in viewing fundamental human rights through the prism
of a court interpreting a document that owes so much to its American
origins. However, the citation did not go unnoticed in Congress, in
which was introduced both a bill 14 and a separate resolution 15 objecting
to such citations. While neither the proposed bill nor the resolution
appears to have progressed much beyond the submission state, the text
of the bill is worth some reflection.
In its only operative section, the bill purports to limit the judicial
use of:
[T]he constitution, laws, administrative rules, executive orders,
directives, policies, or judicial decisions of any international
organization or foreign state, except for the English constitutional
and common law or other sources of law relied upon by the
Framers of the Constitution of the United States. 
16
In its finding section, the bill mentions John Marshall's decision
in Marbury v. Madison. 17 It explicitly castigates two Supreme Court
decisions, Atkins v. Virginia and Lawrence v. Texas that purportedly
"employ[] a new technique of interpretation called 'transjudicialism':
the reliance by American judges upon foreign judicial and other legal
sources outside of American constitutional law."
' 18
13. The European Convention on Human Rights (Nov. 4, 1950),
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html (accessed Dec. 25, 2005).
14. American Justice for Americans Citizens Act, H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1,
2004) (as introduced).
15. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (Mar. 17, 2004) (as introduced) (resolution
sponsored by Rep. Tom Feeney of Florida along with 59 cosponsors, all Republicans).
16. H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. at § 3.
17. Id. at § 2(3).
18. Id. at § 2(5); see also Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Atkins v. Va., which
stated:
But the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national
consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the
views of assorted professional and religious organizations, members of the
so-called "world community," and respondents to opinion polls.... I agree
with [the Chief Justice] ...that the views of professional and religious
organizations and the results of opinion polls are irrelevant. Equally
Vol. 27
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Such statements, however, ignore United States legal history,
both regarding the full panoply of the areas covered by law, as well as
the area traditionally covered by constitutional law. John Marshall, for
example, made frequent use of the laws of nations and the laws of other
countries. Indeed, the history of the incorporation of the protections of
the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment so as to make
them applicable to the states also owes a significant debt to the laws of
other countries as the United States Supreme Court sought definitions
of rights that were so "fundamental" as to be protectable through the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19
In Talbot v. Seeman, an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall for
the Supreme Court prior to Marbury v. Madison,2 1 the Chief Justice
frequently refers to the law of nations, the law of war, and considers as
well the law of France.
22
The case concerned a salvage claim on behalf of the officers and
crew of the United States ship of war, the Constitution.2 3  The
irrelevant are the practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of
justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people. "We must never
forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are
expounding... . [W]here there is not first a settled consensus among our
own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of
this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through
the Constitution."
Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
19. It is ironic that a proposal would attempt to limit citations to foreign authorities
that are "English" for recently "English" courts have routinely cited European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) decisions in very important cases. On December 16, 2004, for
example, the House of Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom, decided a case
about detention of alleged terrorists, none of whom had been charged with a criminal
offense. The Court held improper the government's actions, primarily as a result of the
obligations of the United Kingdom under the European Convention on Human Rights
given domestic effect by the Human Rights Act of 1998. The lead opinion by Lord
Bingham of Cornhill cites European Court of Human Rights cases more frequently
than it cites British cases (27 ECHR cites versus 20 British case cites). Other opinions
in the same case cite only ECHR cases. See separate opinions by Lord Hoffmann, and
Lord Hope of Craighead. The other separate opinions only infrequently cite British
cases, more frequently citing ECHR cases. A and others v. Sec. of St. for the Home
Dept., UKHL 56 (Dec. 16, 2004).
20. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801).
21. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
22. Talbot, 5 U.S. at 29-31.
23. Id. at 1.
2005
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Constitution had recaptured a neutral ship that the French had captured
and were taking to port for a determination of whether the ship was
subject to confiscation because it may have been carrying British
cargo. 24 War then existed between Great Britain and France. Congress
had enacted various statutes to protect American ships from seizure by
French ships, and authorized, upon recapture of any American
merchant ships, that salvage would be allowed to the recapturing
ship. 25 In addition, seizure of armed French vessels was also permitted
by public armed vessels of the United States. 26  Such ships were
subject to forfeiture. 27
However, none of the specific statutes enacted by Congress
applied to a situation in which a neutral ship was recaptured. 2 8 Yet the
Court determined that the law such as it was did not make salvage
impossible. The determination of such a claim would depend on "the
principles of general law." 29 The Court determined that the recapture
of the ship was lawful; but that left remaining the determination of
whether meritorious service had been rendered so as to entitle the re-
capture to salvage. 30 That was to be determined by the laws of war and
the settled doctrine of the law of nations.3 1 There was no doubt that the
general rule of the law of nations was "that a neutral vessel captured by
a belligerent [was] to be discharged without paying salvage .... 32
But "[t]he general principle is, that salvage is only payable where a
meritorious service has been rendered., 33 "But let a nation change its
laws and its practice on this subject; let its legislation be such as to
subject to condemnation all neutrals captured by its cruisers, and who
will say that no benefit is conferred by a re-capture?" 34 Chief Justice
Marshall then went on to examine the law of France and after
24. Id. at 1-3. The ship was originally owned by individuals from Hamburgh,
which was not then at war with France, or with the U.S. Id. at 2.
25. Id. at 29-31.
26. Id. at 30.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 31, 33. "[T]he right of re-capture is expressly given in no single instance,
but that of a vessel or goods belonging to a citizen of the United States." Id. at 33.
29. Id. at 34.
30. Id. at 36.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 37.
34. Id.
Vol. 27
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considering a French statute that subjected to condemnation in the
courts of France, "neutral vessel laden, in whole or in part, with articles
the growth of England or any of its possessions," decided that the state
of hostility between England and France authorized the recapture by
the captain of the USS Constitution.35 Since the danger that the French
courts would authorize confiscation of the vessel and its cargo was
"real and imminent," her danger was also "real and imminent," and
thus the recaptor rendered an essential service and was entitled to
salvage.
36
The heart of the reasoning by Chief Justice Marshall concerned
the scope and application of the law of nations, its content and
exceptions. Congress had not acted, until after the seizure at issue. A
subsequently enacted statute "can certainly not affect that case as to the
quantity of salvage, or give a right to salvage which did not exist
before." 37  While the latter statement does not reflect current
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, it did in John Marshall's court.
Thus the decision turned on the Court's interpretation of the law of
nations, not on United States statutory, case, or constitutional law.
Talbot v. Seeman was not unusual, for many decisions of the
Marshall Court sounded similar themes. The issues ranged from the
mundane to the important. In McCoul v. Lekamp's Administratrix, the
issue was the admissibility of books of account. 38 In footnote, Chief
Justice Marshall addressed the civil or Roman law first, then the codes
of nations of the European continent, the law of France and only after
such discussion turned to the common law of England, and finally the
law of New York and Pennsylvania.39  In Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, Chief Justice Marshall observed that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains . ... ,4 In Mason v. Ship
Blaireau, the Chief Justice referenced the "common usage of
commercial nations," with particular reference to France and England
in determining the law of salvage after a maritime accident. 41
35. Id. at 39, 41.
36. Id. at 42-43.
37. Id. at 34.
38. McCoul v. Lekamp'sAdmx., 15 U.S. 111,115 (1817).
39. Id. at 117 n. a.
40. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
41. Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. 240, 267-68 (1804).
2005
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In a more momentous case, The Antelope, the Court determined
the fate of slaves captured by a privateer from Spanish ships and ships
flying the Portuguese flag. Much of the legal discussion by Chief
Justice Marshall concerned whether the law of nations was violated by
the slave trade. 43 Case law from England was employed to determine
that the law of the flag of the ship determined whether restitution of
slaves to their owners was required. If the flag nation had made the
slave trade illegal, as had England, there was no right of restitution.
44
If it had not, as Sweden had not, then restitution was ordered even by a
British court.45  In the end, the United States Supreme Court
determined that the proportion of slaves that could be fairly traced to
Spanish ownership, were to be returned to the Spanish owners.
46
However, since there was virtually no proof that any Portuguese owner
existed for the remaining slaves, no restitution was ordered to the
Portuguese owner, represented by the Vice Counsel of Portugal.
47
Instead, the remaining slaves were to be transmitted to the United
States "to be disposed of according to law."
48
Whether during Chief Justice John Marshall's first term on the
Court, Talbot v. Seeman, or the last term of his tenure, Mitchel v.
United States, references to the law of nations, or the laws of other
countries such as Spain, were frequent.
4 9
42. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 70 (1825).
43. Id. at 115-23.
44. Id. at 118.
45. Id. at 117-18.
46. Id. at 126-28. The Vice-Counsel for Spain claimed 150 as belonging to Spanish
subjects. However, the Court limited this claim to 93 slaves, pursuant to a deposition
of the captured ship, reduced as well in proportion to the fact that approximately a third
of the slaves had died. At the time of the capture of the ship, the Africans amounted to
upwards of 280. Sixteen had been turned over to the U.S. Marshall as being a fair
proportion of U.S. slaves that had been taken from a U.S. vessel (said to number 25
originally). Id. at 127.
47. Id. at 129-30. The Vice Counsel of Portugal's claim was for 130 slaves, or
more. But in the five years since the seizure of the ship and the determination by the
United States Supreme Court, no subject of the crown of Portugal had appeared to
assert his title. After discussion of the possibility that a false flag might have been
employed by Americans and others who cannot use their own nation's flags, such
possibility is so serious that it may be judicially noticed by Courts of Admiralty. Id.
48. Id. at 132.
49. Mitchel v. U.S., 34 U.S. 711, 725, 734 (Opinion for the Court by Justice
Baldwin, regarding a land title dispute in the territory of Florida).
Vol. 27
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The Marshall Court's practice was echoed by the United States
Supreme Court during its struggles with the incorporation of parts of
the Bill of Rights through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment so as to make certain protections applicable to the states.
In Palko v. Connecticut, the opinion for the Court by Justice Cardozo
considered whether "[tjhe right to trial by jury and the immunity from
prosecution except as the result of an indictment [were] . . . of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," or whether to abolish them
would "violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' ,50 Justice
Black became the champion of a total incorporation theory that
maintained that the entire Bill of Rights should be incorporated and
made applicable as against the states. Justice Black's dissent in
Adamson v. California, contained the essence of his argument, wherein
he rejected the majority's ],osition based as he saw it upon a "natural-
law-due-process formula. ' ' J Justice Frankfurter, who concurred with
the majority opinion in Adamson, strongly disagreed with the total
52incorporation theory of Justice Black. Instead Justice Frankfurter
referenced the "canons of decency and fairness, which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples . . . ,53 Justices
Cardozo and Frankfurter clearly refuse to confine the appropriate
sources of interpretative authority to American sources. Whether
defined as "natural law" or "the search for schemes of ordered liberty"
or "canons of justice of English-speaking peoples" these sources go
beyond the new world, and indeed, beyond the British Isles.
In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court made applicable to
the states the right to trial by jury in serious criminal cases and in doing
so made somewhat more focused the inquiry for the Court when
seeking fundamental rights for potential incorporation. 54 The Duncan
Court spoke of the right to trial by jury as "fundamental to the
American scheme of justice. 55
In the full course of interpreting the nature of rights that are
considered fundamental for purposes of protection in the United States,
50. Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 320, 325 (1937).
51. See Adamson v. Cal., 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 59-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 67.
54. Duncan v. La., 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
55. Id.
2005
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for most of our constitutional history it is fair to maintain that foreign
practices and attitudes have not been ignored as irrelevant. Rather the
experience of other nations, particularly English speaking ones, but the
French and Spanish as well, have been looked to by the Supreme Court
for guidance. To be sure, such references to the law of nations, France
or England, have not been made with the sense that the Supreme Court
is bound by such laws as "binding precedent." But neither are they to
be ignored as sources for illumination on oft-times difficult problems.
56
In The Antelope, Chief Justice Marshall was confronted with a
case which potentially jeopardized the neutrality of the United States in
armed conflict between warring states. To ignore the law of nations in
such context would have been the height of stupidity, a vice that the
Marshall Court seldom displayed.
With this general background, the decision of the Supreme Court
in Lawrence v. Texas will first be analyzed, as well as the decision of
the European Court of Human Rights that was referenced therein.
Then the article will turn to other areas of decision-making by the
European Court of Human Rights to see if there might be other areas in
which useful guidance might be sought. In this search, it is critically
important to be as objective as possible. This must not be a search for
"liberal values" or "conservative values" that will reflect the position of
either this author or the reader.
II. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR DEVIATE
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS
The petitioners in Lawrence v. Texas had been convicted of
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex after
entering pleas of nolo contendere.57 The opinion for the Court by
Justice Kennedy framed the issue as "determining whether the
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution." 58 After discussing precedents such
56. In the classic commerce clause of Wickard v. Filburn, the Court cited the
practices of regulating wheat in the countries of Argentina, Australia, and Canada as
supportive of Congress's power to regulate homegrown wheat. Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 125-26, 126 n. 27 (1942).
57. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003) (each was fined $200 and assessed
court costs of $141.25).
58. Id. at 564.
Vol. 27
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as Pierce v. Society of Sisters,59 Meyer v. Nebraska,6 0 Griswold v.
61 62 63Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade, the Court turned
to consideration of its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.
The Georgia statute in Bowers prohibited the same conduct as in
Lawrence regardless of whether the conduct was engaged in by persons
of the same sex. 64 With that exception, the cases were quite similar as
far as the Court was concerned. The Lawrence decision reviewed the
Bowers opinion and determined that the Bowers Court had
fundamentally misconstrued the right at issue, considering the right to
engage in sodomy as the right at issue, whereas the Lawrence Court
considered the right a right of adult privacy. 65 The opinion then turned
to a discussion of the legal history, or not, of laws against
homosexuality. The Court reviewed laws as far back as the
Reformation Parliament of 1533, as well as American nineteenth
century statutes dealing with sodomy, buggery, and crimes-against-
nature statutes. 66  The Court also considered the infrequency of
prosecutions for such conduct. 67  The Court concluded after this
examination that the first time any state singled out same-sex relations
for criminal prosecution was in the 1970s, and that only nine states had
done so.68 In sum, the Court concluded that the historical grounds
relied upon in Bowers were doubtful "and, at the very least,
overstated."
6 9
The Court then commenced its own review of legal authorities,
including recognition that the Model Penal Code promulgated in 1955
by the American Law Institute "did not recommend or provide for
59. Id. Pierce stood for the inability of the State to prohibit religious schools. 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
60. Id. Meyer held that the State cannot prohibit teaching the German language.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
61. Id. (State may not criminalize distribution of information regarding
contraceptives.).
62. Id. at 565 (Law invalidated prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried individuals.).
63. Id. at 565 (Recognition of the fundamental right of a woman to make decisions
regarding abortion.).
64. Id. at 566.
65. Id. at 566-67.
66. Id. at 568.
67. Id. at 569.
68. Id. at 570.
69. Id. at 559.
2005
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'criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in
private.' "70 After recognition that sodomy prohibitions had seldom
been enforced, including in Georgia (the state involved in Bowers), the
Court turned to other sources of authority following upon Chief Justice
Burger's analysis of Western civilization and Judeo-Christian moral
and ethical standards. 71 A committee advising the British parliament
in 1957 recommended the repeal of laws criminalizing homosexual
conduct.7 2  A decade later that recommendation was adopted by
Parliament.73
It is at that point that Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
references for the first time, a decision by the European Court of
Human Rights. Then in a paragraph of six sentences and fewer than
150 words, the Court cites Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.74 The
paragraph ends with the following sentence: "Authoritative in all
countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then,
45 nations now), the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that
the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization."
75
Immediately afterwards, the opinion returns to United States law
and practice. The very next paragraph noted that the twenty-five states
at the time of Bowers that prohibited the relevant conduct had been
reduced to thirteen and only four enforced their laws against
homosexual conduct. Indeed, Texas's admission in 1994 that it had
not prosecuted anyone under those circumstances was also noted.77
The opinion then turned to two Supreme Court decisions
subsequent to Bowers: Romer v. Evans and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.78  Casey, a case dealing with
abortion, confirmed that "our laws and tradition afford constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education."79
70. Id. at 572 (citing Model Penal Code § 213.2, comment 2 (ALI 1980)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 572-73.
73. Id. at 573.
74. Id. (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 573-74 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Planned Parenthood
of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
79. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
Vol. 27
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Romer invalidated a Colorado constitutional provision that deprived
homosexuals, lesbians and bisexuals of protection under state
antidiscrimination laws.80  The Court discussed the collateral
consequences of criminal convictions, including that at least four states
would require persons convicted of such offenses to register as sex
offenders. I
The Court concluded that the foundations of Bowers sustained
serious erosion both from the Supreme Court's own decisions, legal
commentators within the United States and the rejection of its principle
by five different states. 82  Then, in one additional paragraph, the
opinion returned to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, citing not only the Dudgeon case, but also P. G. and another v.
United Kingdom,83 Modinos v. Cyprus, and Norris v. Ireland.84 These
cases were cited for the proposition that to the extent that Bowers relied
upon values shared with a wider civilization, the reasoning of Bowers
had been rejected elsewhere, including by the European Court of
Human Rights which followed its Dudgeon precedent, not Bowers.85
The Dudgeon case involved a thirty-five year old British citizen
86resident in Northern Ireland. Mr. Dudgeon's home was searched
pursuant to a warrant to search for narcotics. 87 A quantity of cannabis
was found during the search and another person was subsequently
charged with drug offenses. 88  Personal papers and diaries were
discovered which described homosexual activity.89 The petitioner was
80. Id. at 574.
8 1. Id. at 575. In a separate opinion predicated upon equal protection rather than
due process, Justice O'Connor noted that among other consequences such convictions
would disqualify petitioners from engaging in a number of professions including
medicine, athletic training, and interior design. Id. at 579, 581. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
82. Id. at 576 (majority).
83. See infra nn. 122-26 and accompanying text.
84. Id. at 576 (citing P.G. & another v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44787/98 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Sept. 25, 2001) (available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (accessed Dec. 25, 2005));
Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1988)).
85. Id.
86. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 13 (1981).
87. Id. at para. 33.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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subjected to four-and-a-half hours of questioning at a local police
station about his sexual activities and his file was forwarded to the
Director of Public Prosecutions. 90 The Director, in consultation with
the Attorney General, decided that it was not in the public interest to
bring charges. 91  A year and a month after the search had been
conducted, the petitioner was informed that he would not be
prosecuted.
92
Under the law of Britain at the time, no prosecution could have
occurred against the petitioner in England, Wales, or Scotland as a
result of decriminalization of consensual homosexual conduct between
consenting adults.93 Changes proposed to the law of Northern Ireland
had not been adopted, partly because of public opposition in Northern
Ireland including, in particular, the opposition of various religious
groups. 94 There was, however, support for proposed decriminalization
as well.95 The parliament for Northern Ireland had been prorogued in
1972 and the counties were subjected to direct rule from
Westminster.
96
In practice, however, such conduct was not prosecuted in
Northern Ireland. During the period of January 1972 to October 1980
there were sixty two prosecutions for homosexual offenses in Northern
Ireland. 97  None of which involved consenting adults, the majority
involved minors (i.e. under the age of eighteen) and a few aged
eighteen to twenty-one or mental patients or prisoners.
9 8
The claims before the European Court of Human Rights by
petitioner were failure to respect the petitioner's private life, in breach
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at para. 17 n. 3. The age of consent was first defined as twenty-one years of
age, and later recommended to be lowered to eighteen years. Id. By the time of the
Dudgeon case the age had not been lowered in statute. Attempts to amend the statutory
law for Scotland were successful in 1980 decriminalizing consensual homosexual
sexual activity between adults. Id. at para. 18. Prior to that statutory change,
successive Lord Advocates had represented in Parliament that the government's policy
was not to prosecute offenses in Scotland that would not have been criminal under the
laws of England and Wales. Id.
94. Id. at para. 25.
95. Id.
96. Id. at para. 20.
97. Id. at para. 30.
98. Id.
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of Article 899 of the Convention and discrimination in breach of Article
14100 of the Convention.
The Court held by a vote of fifteen to four that Article 8 was
violated by an unjustified interference with the right to respect for
private life, but by a vote of fourteen to five that it did not have to
reach any issue under Article 14 (equal protection) of the
Convention.101 In reaching its decision regarding Article 8, the Court
considered the government's argument that it sought to protect
vulnerable members of society, such as the young, as well as the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others as well as morals. 
1 02
In that context, however, the issue became whether the Northern
Ireland provisions were necessary in a democratic society.10 3  The
Court considered that the legislation in Northern Ireland differed from
that existing in the great majority of the member states. 104 Despite the
deference ordinarily given to nation states under the Convention1 05 the
Court considered that the practices 106 at issue in Dudgeon "concerns a
99. Id. at para. 38. Article 8 provides:
[(1)] Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
[(2)] There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
Id. at para. 38.
100. Id. at para. 65. Article 14 provides:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Id. at para. 64.
101. Id. at paras. 63, 70, 72. One of the dissenting Judges, Judge Pinheiro Farina,
considered that since there had been no enforcement against the petitioner the Court
should have had no jurisdiction to consider the case. Id. at paras. 5-6 (Farina, J.,
dissenting).
102. Id. at para. 47 (majority).
103. Id. at para. 48.
104. Id. at para. 49.
105. Id. at para. 52. Deference is referred to as a "margin of appreciation." Id.
106. Id. at 49. "What distinguishe[d] the law [of] Northern Ireland from that existing
in the great majority of the member-States [was] that it prohibit[ed] generally gross
indecency between males and buggery whatever the circumstances." Id.
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most intimate aspect of private life."10 7 That required the existence of
particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part of public
authorities could be legitimate under Article 8(2). 108
Justification required a proportional relationship between the
government's aims and the utilization of penal provisions to achieve
such aims. 10 9 In considering this matter the Court considered that the
moral climate in Northern Ireland might be different from that in the
remainder of Great Britain. 110 In part that difference explains why
Westminster was reluctant to impose a legislative solution upon
Northern Ireland. 1 l A need for caution and for sensitivity to public
opinion in Northern Ireland was conceded.
1 12
Considering the "essentially private manifestation of the human
personality" at issue, the Court noted that in the great majority of the
member states of the Council of Europe, penal sanctions are no longer
considered necessary or appropriate.' Indeed, in Northern Ireland,
not only have the authorities not prosecuted such conduct in recent
years against consenting males over the age of twenty-one years
capable of valid consent, but also there had been no evidence submitted
that this had been injurious to the moral standards of Northern
Ireland. 114  Thus, the existence of a pressing social need for such
legislation could not be seen.1 1 5  While decriminalization does not
involve approval, the shock or offense or disturbance of members of
the public from the commission of such acts by consenting adults does
not warrant the use of penal sanctions.
116
On the other hand, the Court did conclude that there was a
legitimate necessity in a democratic society to safeguard the
vulnerable, including those vulnerable by reason of their youth. 1 7 As
107. Id. at para. 52 n. 21.
108. Id.
109. Id. at paras. 53, 54.
110. Id. at para. 56.
111. Id. at para. 58. In this connection, it should be noted that the legislative changes
in England and Wales, as well as the separate changes in Scotland had all originated as
Private Members' (i.e. not governmentally proposed) bills. Id. at paras. 17-18.
112. Id. atpara. 58.
113. Id. at para. 60.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at paras. 60-61
117. Id. at para. 62.
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a result, the request that the age of consent for male homosexual
conduct should be the same as that for heterosexual and female
homosexual relations, (seventeen years of age in Northern Ireland),
was rejected. 118 It was moreover determined that deference should be
given to the judgment of the member states as to the determination of
the appropriate age of majority. 119
While the opinions in Lawrence v. Texas make no mention of the
age of consent issue, it is clear that the Dudgeon decision on that issue
might very well form the basis for a decision limiting Lawrence itself
in the future. 120 It is fair to ask whether such a determination should
be ignored in further litigation before the United States Supreme
Court.
12 1
118. Id.
119. Id. at para. 62.
120. One of the other cases cited by the Supreme Court from the European Court of
Human Rights is a Cyprus case, in which a prosecution had been distinguished by the
Supreme Court of Cyprus from Dudgeon, since the defendant, a 19 year old soldier did
not commit the offense in private. Costa v. The Republic, 2 Cyprus L.R. 120 (1982),
discussed in Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 11, 20-21 (1993).
The discussion in Modinos would reinforce the requirement that applicable conduct
must be private to be protected. Id.
121. One of the dissenting Judges in Dudgeon in an exercise of renvoi, noted that the
Supreme Court of the U.S. as of the date of the Dudgeon decision had refused to extend
the constitutional guarantee of privacy to homosexual activities or heterosexual
sodomy outside of marriage. The effect was described as to uphold as virtually
absolute privacy within marriage and privacy of sexual activity within the marriage.
Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 21 (Walsh, J., partially dissenting). Judge Walsh
also did not think the Petitioner in Dudgeon was a victim and thus should not have had
standing. Id. at para. 6.
In two of the other European Court of Human Rights cases cited by Lawrence as
following Dudgeon, the specific issue was of the right of privacy precluding possible
penal actions against consensual adult homosexuality. Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) para. 10 (1988). The principle in Dudgeon was extended from Northern
Ireland to Ireland itself. The petitioner in Norris, a lecturer at Trinity College, Dublin
and member of the Irish parliament elected by the graduates of Dublin University, had
not been prosecuted, or even investigated in contrast to Dudgeon. Id. at paras. 8, 11.
However, his participation in a television program on a state-broadcasting channel in
1975 had formed the basis of a complaint against the television program, a complaint
that had been upheld for violation of the Current/Public Affairs Broadcasting Code in
that it could be interpreted as advocacy of homosexual practices. Id. at para. 10.
Notwithstanding the absence of threat of or actual prosecution the Grand Chamber held
by a vote of eight to six that Norris was a victim within the meaning of the Convention
and by a similar vote that his rights to a private life had been violated. However, no
damages were awarded, it being considered that the declaration of the decision was
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Examination of one of the other European Court of Human Rights
cases cited by the Supreme Court in Lawrence also is worthwhile, for
several additional principles of constitutional law are suggested. For
example, law needs to be public to be constitutional. 122 Police secret
taping of conversations within a home must be pursuant to legislative
authority-not simply pursuant to non-public and non-binding home
office guidelines. 12  Similarly, secret recording of conversations while
a defendant was being booked at the police station and while in a jail
cell, all done without legislative authority, also violated appropriate
respect for private life. 
124
On the other hand, competing public interests must be considered
in the context of fair trial rights, and sometimes the rights of the
accused give way to interests in national security and/or protection of
specific prosecutorial interests (protection of informants against
reprisals). In camera testimony without the defense present regarding
surveillance measures and background questions about surveillance
was held not to be violative of the defendant's rights to a fair trial
considering the competing interests of national security and the need to
protect witnesses at risk of reprisal. 12 5 Moreover, the use of secretly
taped conversations for voice sample purposes was analogized to the
taking of blood samples, or hair samples, to which a privilege against
self incrimination does not apply, and held not to violate the fair trial
rights of the defendants. 
126
adequate, although the Court did award legal costs and expenses to Norris in the
amount of IRf14,962.49 less 7,390 French francs already paid in legal aid. Id. at paras.
34, 52.
Similarly, an ordinary chamber of the court extended Dudgeon to Cyprus in Modinos v.
Cyprus by a vote of eight to one. Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para.
33 (1993). Although the basis of the dissent by the ad hoc Cyprus judge was that the
law and practice of Cyprus already made impossible criminal prosecution of private,
consenting adult homosexual practices. Id. at Pikis, J. dissenting.
122. See generally P.G. and another v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44787/98 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Sept. 25, 2001) (available at http://cmiskp.echr.
coe.int/tkp 1 97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (accessed Nov. 26, 2005)).
123. Id. at paras. 35, 38.
124. Id. at paras. 62-63. The court noted that Great Britain, subsequent to the dates
of the case at issue, enacted specific legislation covering covert listening devices by the
police on their own premises. Id. at para. 63.
125. Id. at paras. 68, 71-73.
126. Id. at paras. 80, 81.
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III. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY IN SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH
ADOLESCENTS
In a related series of cases, however, the European Court of
Human Rights considered questions of equality with respect to age and
consent in regards to sexual relationships. In BB v. United Kingdom,
the Court considered whether the United Kingdom could apply a
different age of consent to heterosexual sexual relationships from that
of homosexual sexual relationships. 127 The Court unanimously held
that the United Kingdom could not criminalize homosexual conduct
below the age of eighteen (and sixteen or above) when it did not
criminalize heterosexual relations at the age of sixteen or above.
1 28
Reflection on such considerations of equality might require
reevaluation of the ages of consent in various states of the United
States for similar purposes where distinctions based upon age often
infuse rape statutes. The Supreme Court's decision in Michael M v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County, might stand reexamination. 129 That
case considered California's statutory rape law, which criminalized the
male participant but not the female participant when the woman was
under eighteen years of age and not married to the male. 
130
The BB v. United Kingdom decision followed two similar
decisions. One involved actual criminal conviction for homosexual
conduct with an adolescent (the Austrian statutory ban covered ages
fourteen up to eighteen). 13 1  Austrian law criminalized only male
relationships with adult males, not young women's relationships with
adult females, or males. 132 The second Austrian case, SL v. Austria,
involved a petitioner who realized he was a homosexual at the age of
127. BB v. United Kingdom, App. No. 53760/00 paras. 23-25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 10,
2004) (available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (accessed Dec. 25, 2005)).
128. Id. at paras. 24, 41.
129. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
130. Id. at 466.
131. L and V v. Austria, App. Nos. 39392/98 and 39829/98 paras. 18, 19 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Jan. 9, 2003) (available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp 1 97/search.asp?skin=haddock-en (accessed Dec. 25, 2005)).
132. Id. The court awarded the petitioner 15,000 euro for non-pecuniary damage and
costs and expenses of 10,633.53, and the second petitioner 15,000 euro and costs and
expenses of 6,500 euro. Id. at para. 69.
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fifteen but was prevented from practicing any relationships with adults
until reaching the age of eighteen. 1
33
IV. THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE ALLOWS THE STATE TO PREVENT
ADOPTION OF A CHILD BY A HOMOSEXUAL
There are limits, however, to the extent to which the principle of
equality must be accorded to homosexuals-for example, when they
seek prior authorization to adopt a child.
In Frette v. France, the Court considered a request for prior
approval for purposes of adoption by a single man who was
homosexual. 134 Frette had litigated his request for such permission to
•' t135 T
the highest administrative court in France, the Conseil d'Etat. The
Court concluded that the homosexuality of the petitioner was the
decisive factor in denying the authorization for adoption. 
136
The Court considered various arguments advanced by the
government seeking to justify the difference in treatment. One
argument rejected by the Court was that such a child might be
133. SL v. Austria, App. No. 45330/99 paras. 9-10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 9, 2003)
(available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (accessed Dec. 25, 2005)). The court awarded 5,000 euro
for non-pecuniary damage and 5,000 euro for costs and expenses. Id. at para. 56 (laid
out in the court's holding section). The Court noted that there was regular prosecution,
an average of sixty criminal prosecutions a year with a conviction in about a third of
the cases. Id. at para. 14. Subsequent to the filing of this case, Austria repealed the
relevant statutory section and enacted provisions that criminalized sexual conduct with
persons under the age of sixteen if there is any imposition upon the juvenile, or if there
is payment for the activity. Id. at para. 15. These provisions apply regardless of
whether the sexual acts are heterosexual, homosexual, or lesbian. Id. The Court
determined that even though the repeal accomplished part of what the petitioner
sought, it remained appropriate to award damages because the applicant was precluded
from entering into relationships until he reached the age of eighteen. Id. at para. 52.
134. Frette v. France, App. No. 36515/97 paras. 9, 10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 26, 2002)
(available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (accessed Dec. 25, 2005)).
135. Id. at para. 21. He also complained that he had not been notified before the
hearing before the Counseil d'Etat so that he could attend. Id. at para. 2. Had he been
represented by an attorney, the attorney would have received four days notice. Id. at
paras. 21, 22. The Court determined that his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the
Convention was violated by that lack of notice and awarded costs and expenses in the
amount of 3,500 euro. Id. at para. 58.
136. Id. at para. 32.
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stigmatized in the short term. 137  However, given what the Court
determined to be a total lack of consensus in the Council of Europe
about the advisability of allowing a single homosexual to adopt a child,
a wide margin of appreciation (i.e. great deference) must be given to a
government that determines it is not in the best interests of a child to
permit such an adoption. 138  The Court concluded then that no
violation of Article 14 (equal protection) of the Convention had
occurred. 139 Among other reasons the Court noted that there were not
enough children to satisfy the demand for adoption, and that the
scientific community was divided over the possible consequences of a
child being adopted by one or more homosexual parents. 4 ° Would a
court in the United States not consider similar factors were a similar
case presented?
V. WHEN DOES LIFE BEGIN: ROE V. WADE IN EUROPE?
In July 2004, the European Court of Human Rights issued a
decision in which it indicated that it could not itself determine when
life began regarding an unborn child. 14 1 Instead, that issue was left to
the discretionary determination of the member states of the Council of
Europe. 14 2  The case before the Court, however, did not involve a
voluntary abortion, as did Roe v. Wade. 14 3  The case involved the
tragic consequences of a medical mistake and the conduct of the wrong
operation upon the wrong woman. 144  The misfortune of the young
woman was then compounded by her erroneous choice of a criminal
137. Id. at para. 35. To accept that argument would be to give a right of veto to
parties who were motivated by such prejudice. The Court cited, inter alia, a U.S.
Supreme Court case, Palmore v. Sidoti, where the Court refused to permit a trial court
judge to award custody of children to the divorced father because the mother remarried
to a husband of another race. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984).
138. Frette, App. No. 36515/97 at paras. 36, 41-43.
139. Id. at para. 43.
140. Id. at para. 42.
141. See generally Vo v. France, App. No. 53924/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 2004)
(available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
search.asp?skin=haddock-en (accessed Dec. 25, 2005)).
142. Id. at para. 82.
143. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
144. Vo, App. No. 53924/00 at paras. 11,12.
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legal route in the French court system rather than an administrative
civil tort remedy route.
145
The applicant, Mrs. Thi-Nho Vo, who was of Vietnamese origin,
went to a hospital in Lyon for a scheduled medical examination during
her sixth month of pregnancy. 146 At the same time waiting in the same
waiting room, another woman, Mrs. Thi Thanh Van Vo was at the
hospital to have a coil removed. 14 7 When the name Vo was called,
Mrs. Thi-Nho Vo responded. 14 8  After a brief interview by the
physician, who noted that she had difficulty understanding French, the
physician sought to remove the coil without a prior examination. 149 In
doing so he pierced the amniotic sac causing the loss of a substantial
amount of amniotic fluid. 150  Both Mrs. Vos were admitted to the
hospital, and a further error was narrowly averted the next morning
when Mrs. Thi-Nho Vo was taken to the operating theatre instead of
Mrs. Thi Thanh Van Vo, for removal of the coil. 151 This time Mrs. Vo
objected and she was recognized by an anesthetist. 152 Mrs. Thi-Nho
Vo left the hospital to return several days later. 153 It was discovered at
that time that the amniotic fluid had not been replaced and the
pregnancy was then terminated on health grounds. 
154
Mrs. Thi-Nho Vo and her partner filed a criminal complaint and
applied to be joined as civil parties to the criminal proceeding alleging,
inter alia, unintentional homicide of her child and total unfitness for
work for a period not exceeding three months.
155
Expert evaluations were conducted which concluded that the fetus
was in all respects normal, no permanent damage had been done to
145. Id. at para. 74. Under French law as well as other civil law countries such as
Italy, it is possible for a complaining party to attach a request for damages to a criminal
action. The criminal action and the essentially civil action are tried together. In the
U.S. of course, actions such as tort actions, would be brought as separate suits.
146. Id. at para. 10.
147. Id. atpara. 11.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. atpara. 12.
154. Id.
155. Id. atpara. 13.
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Mrs. Vo, and that the doctor acted negligently, by omission, and is
accountable for the error.
15 6
A criminal complaint was filed charging the physician with
causing unintentional injury, through negligence or inattention, leading
to the child's death.1 57 Although the physician was ordered to stand
trial on counts of unintentional homicide and unintentionally causing
injuries, a year later the criminal court determined that the physician
was entitled as of right to an amnesty under an amnesty law regarding
the offense of negligently causing injury entailing temporary unfitness
for work. 158 On the second charge, unintentionally causing the death
of the child, the Court acquitted the physician since it could not
determine that French law defined a fetus of the age of twenty to
twenty-one weeks as a viable fetus (six months), as a person. 159
On appeal, the Lyons Court of Appeals affirmed the acquittal on
the charge of unintentionally causing injuries, but reversed the other
decision finding the physician guilty of unintentional homicide, and
imposed a sentence of a six month suspended prison sentence, a fine of
10,000 francs and civil compensation to Mrs. Vo in the amount of
5,000 francs. 16 That court made references to international treaties,
including the European Convention on Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which it asserted recognized a
right to life protected for everyone, and notably children. 1 l The
appeals court also considered various decisions by the highest court of
France, the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation, one of which
indicated that by implication the Convention on the Rights of the Child
could concern a fetus aged less than ten weeks.
1 62
That decision was appealed to the Court of Cassation which
reversed the decision of the court of appeals and determined that a
remand was not necessary. 16 3 The Court of Cassation determined that
156. Id. atparas. 14-16.
157. Id. at para. 17. The complaint also alleged that the physician caused bodily
injury resulting in the unfitness for work for a period of not more than three months,
itself a criminal offense. Id.
158. Id. atpara. 19.
159. Id.
160. Id. at para. 21.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at para. 22.
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the court of appeals had misinterpreted French law.164 The Court of
Cassation based its determination on the rule of strict construction in
criminal cases. 
165
The European Court of Human Rights examined the question of
whether the failure of French law to punish the unintentional
destruction of a fetus constituted a failure of the State to protect the
right to life within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention.166 The
court noted the difference in text between the European Convention on
Human Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights.
167
The American Convention explicitly provided that protection should be
accorded " 'from the moment of conception' "; the European
Convention does not.168 The Court also examined prior case law from
the European Court of Human Rights, concluding that that
jurisprudence did not establish that an unborn child was entitled to
protection as distinct from the mother under Article 2 of the
Convention. 169 However, the Vo case presented a new issue, where the
interests of the mother and unborn child were consistent. 
170
The Court determined that it should not enter the debate about
when life begins. 171 The absence of consensus without the member
states of the Council of Europe, and indeed, the inability in France
itself, to resolve the particular question, counted against the propriety
of the Court becoming involved. 172 The Court declared, it was
"convinced that it is neither desirable, nor even possible as matters
stand, to answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is
a person for the purposes of art 2 of the Convention .... 173
164. Id. at para. 29.
165. Id.
166. Id. at para. 74.
167. Id. at para. 75.
168. Id.
169. Id. at paras. 75-80 (Most of these cases dealt with voluntary abortions where the
mother's interests were at odds with the interests of the fetus.).
170. Id. atpara. 81.
171. Id. at para. 82.
172. Id. at paras. 82-84. Among other matters referenced the French National
Assembly twice rejected attempts to adopt bills creating the offense of involuntary
termination of pregnancy, the last time after a "fierce controversy" regarding which the
Minister of Justice declared the proposal " 'caused more problems than it solved.' " Id.
at paras. 32-33.
173. Id. at para. 85 (emphasis added).
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The Court, however, went on to determine that it was not
necessary to find that French law lacked adequate protection for the
unborn with the absence of a criminal statute on the subject. 174 A civil
remedy was adequate, and the court found that it was clear that a civil
remedy against the authorities did exist in France in the context of an
administrative court action for civil damages against the taking of the
life of the fetus. 175 It drew a distinction between the State intentionally
taking life and the State safeguarding the lives of those within its
protection. 176
In Roe v. Wade the United States Supreme Court refused to
determine when life began. 177 "When those trained in ... medicine,
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not
in a position to speculate as to the answer."' 178 The Vo decision and
Roe are identical in this respect-demonstrating similarity between the
European situation and the American one.
VI. MAY ONE NATION STATE PROHIBIT DISSEMINATION OF
INFORMATION ABOUT ABORTION SERVICES IN ANOTHER NATION
STATE?
The United States Supreme Court dealt with an analogous
question in the case of Rust v. Sullivan.179  In Rust regulations
promulgated by the Health and Human Services Department of the
federal government prohibited (inter alia) personnel involved in any
project receiving federal family planning funds from providing
counseling involving the use of abortion for family planning or
providing referral for abortion services. 18  The Supreme Court
sustained that prohibition in the context of attacks based both upon the
First Amendment and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. 181
174. Id. at para. 90.
175. Id. at paras. 91, 94.
176. Id. at para. 88. The Court was not concerned by the fact that by the time of the
Court of Cassation decision the statute of limitation had run on filing the administrative
tort action. Id. at paras. 92-93. There was in fact a remedy potentially available.
177. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
178. Id.
179. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
180. Id. at 179.
181. Id. at 203. Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens dissented in one opinion.
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Since the government had no duty to subsidize abortion itself, it was
also under no duty to provide information about such services.
182
Indeed, it mattered not that the services were medically necessary for a
particular woman. 
183
The European Court of Human Rights dealt with a series of cases
involving injunctions in Ireland effectively closing down not-for-profit
clinics providing non-directive counseling, including references to
abortion facilities in other countries. 184 Irish criminal law made it an
offense to attempt to procure or to procure an abortion, or to administer
an abortion or to assist in an abortion. 18 5  "Furthermore, Irish
constitutional law also protected the right to life of the unborn from the
moment of conception onwards." 186 The applicant clinics submitted
evidence in the European Court of Human Rights that the number of
abortions of Irish women in Great Britain since the granting of the
injunction was well over 3,500 per year. 187 It was suggested that the
failure to permit referrals would, among other results, increase the
delays in obtaining abortions and result in poor aftercare with a failure
to deal adequately with medical complications. 188 The Irish Supreme
Court had sustained the injunctions.
Irish law, however, was not invariably protective of the life of the
unborn. In another case the Irish Supreme Court had discharged an
injunction when the case dealt with an allegedly suicidal, pregnant
Id. (Blackmun, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Justice O'Connor dissented in a
separate opinion based upon the ground that the regulations exceeded statutory
authority. Id. at 223, 224-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 201.
183. Id.
184. Open Door and another v. Ireland, App. Nos. 14234/88 and 14235/88 para. 15
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 29, 1992) (available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=haddock-en (accessed Dec. 25,
2005)). One of the injunctions provided " 'that the Defendants . .. be perpetually
restrained from counseling or assisting pregnant women with the jurisdiction of this
Court to obtain further advice on abortion or to obtain an abortion.' " Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at para. 26.
188. Id. In the Irish Supreme Court the argument was made that if the applicants did
not provide the counseling service "it was likely that pregnant women would succeed
nevertheless in obtaining an abortion in circumstances less advantageous to their
health." Id. at para. 18.
189. Id. at para. 20.
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fourteen-Kear-old girl who wanted to leave the jurisdiction to obtain an
abortion. 90
The issue as presented to the European Court of Human Rights
was whether the restriction embodied in the injunctions was necessary
in a democratic society for the protection of morals in relationship to
the freedom to receive and impart information as provided by Article
10 of the Convention.19 1 The Court focused on the issue of whether
the injunctions were necessary in a democratic society. 192  The
government argued that there was no general restriction upon the
discussion of abortion generally, or upon the right of women to travel
abroad to obtain one. 193 The protection of the right to life, asserted the
government, might necessitate the infringement of other rights in a
manner that might not be acceptable were lesser rights at issue. 
19 4
The Court, however, asserted its power to review the situation
and refused to defer to the State's discretion in the matter. 195  The
Court recalled that the protection of freedom of expression is also
applicable to " 'information' or 'ideas' that offend, shock or disturb
the State or any sector of the population." 196 "Such are the demands of
that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is
no 'democratic society.' ,,197 The limitation of activities which are
190. Id. at para. 25 (citing Atty. Gen. v. X and others, 15 BMLR 104 (1992)).
191. Article 10 provides:
[(1)] Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
[(2)] The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
European Convention on Human Rights art. 10 (Nov. 4, 1950),
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html (accessed Dec. 26, 2005).
192. Open Door, App. Nos. 14234/88 and 14235/88 at para. 66.
193. Id. at para. 67.
194. Id.
195. Id. at para. 68.
196. Id. at para. 71.
197. Id.
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legal in other Convention countries, call for careful scrutiny as to their
conformity with the tenets of a democratic society. 198 The absolute
nature of the injunction struck the Court as imposing a perpetual
restraint upon the imparting of information regardless of age or state of
health or the reasons women sought counseling on the termination of
pregnancy. 199 The sweeping nature of the restriction was highlighted
by the case of Attorney General v. X and others and the concession
made during oral argument that the injunction no longer applied to
women in similar circumstances who were now free to have an
abortion in Ireland or abroad. 200 The Court considered the restriction
overly broad and disproportionate. 2 01 It also considered significant
that the clinics involved did not advocate or encourage abortion, but
simply explained available options, thus the link between providing
information and destruction of unborn life was not as definite as
202
contended. Moreover, the information was not provided to the
public at large, although such information through phone books and
magazines was already available in Ireland.2 03 The court also weighed
the adverse health impacts upon women, particularly those without
resources. 2 04 Considering the current level of abortions obtained by
Irish women abroad, the Court concluded that the restraint on
imparting information was disproportionate to the aims pursued
constituting a breach of Article 10.
20 5
Would an approach similar to that of the European Court of
Human Rights have changed the result in the Rust decision? The
restriction in Rust was far more limited-however, the impact,
particularly forbidding abortion references even when the life of the
woman was at issue, would seem plainly inconsistent with the
treatment of The Attorney General v. X by the Irish Supreme Court, a
major factor in the European Court of Human Rights' determination.
198. Id. at para. 72.
199. Id. at para. 73.
200. Id.
201. Id. at para. 74.
202. Id. at para. 75.
203. Id. at paras. 75-76.
204. Id. at para. 77.
205. Id. at paras. 78, 80. The judges voted fifteen to eight that Article 10 had been
violated. One of the two clinic applicants requested damages for the period it was
closed. The Court awarded IR£ 25,000 plus substantial attorneys fees. Id. at pars. 88-
94.
Vol. 27
HeinOnline  -- 27 Whittier L. Rev.  384 2005-2006
MESSAGES FROM STRASBOURG
VII. MAY A GOVERNMENT BE CIVILLY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING
CHILDREN FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE?
The European Court of Human Rights held in Z and others v.
United Kingdom that the United Kingdom was financially responsible
when its child protective workers permitted psychological and physical
abuse from the abuse and neglect of parents after the situation had been
brought to the attention of government authorities. 206 Such a failure
was found to constitute a breach of the requirements of Article 13 of
the Convention that guarantees the availability of a remedy to enforce
the substance of Convention rights.2 07 The failure of United Kingdom
law to make available a tort remedy against the government for the
negligence of the local authority meant that the children's experiences,
described as horrific by a psychiatrist, 20 8 implicated a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention, the infliction of inhumane and degrading
treatment upon the children. The Court awarded the children various
amounts ranging from 36,000 to 132,000 pounds, plus legal costs and
expenses.2 °9
The earlier decision in A v. United Kingdom, had reached a
similar result in somewhat more bizarre circumstances. 2 10 The
government had criminally charged a nine-year-old child's stepfather
with assault causing bodily harm.2 11 The jury, however, acquitted the
stepfather, despite medical testimony about the bruises left by a cane
over a course of several days of beatings. 2 12  The child then
complained to the European Court of Human Rights that the state had
failed to adequately protect him against the ill treatment by his
stepfather. 2 13 The complaint specifically alleged that Article 3 of the
206. Z and others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29392/95 para. 121 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
May 10, 2001) (available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197
/search.asp?skin=haddock-en (accessed Dec. 25, 2005)). (The Court found a direct
causal connection between the government's breach of a duty to protect the children
and the children's injuries from their abusive parents.).
207. Id. at para. 108.
208. Id. at para. 102.
209. Id. at paras. 127, 131, 135.
210. A v. United Kingdom, App. No. 100/1997/884/1096 paras. 34, 37 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Sept. 23, 1998) (available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp 197/search.asp?skin=haddock-en (accessed Dec. 25, 2005)).
211. Id. atpara. 12.
212. Id. at paras. 9, 11.
213. Id. at para. 16.
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214Convention had been violated. Article 3 prohibited torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 2 15  The Court
considered that the treatment reached the level of severity required by
Article 3216 and furthermore held that the law failed to provide
adequate protection against treatment or punishment contrary to Article
3.2 17 Frankly, it is quite unclear what the Court expected the
government to have done. It recalled that the burden was on the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault went
beyond the limits of lawful punishment.2 18 In a preceding paragraph
the Court recited various earlier decisions and the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child for the proposition that it was the
obligation of the high contracting parties to secure rights for the child
through state protection in the form of effective deterrence.2 19 The
United Nations Convention was quoted:
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative,
social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms
of physical violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation ... while in the care of
parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care
of the child.A2
Whatever the Court considered the proper remedy, the holding of
violation and awarding of non-pecuniary damages of 10,000 pounds
and 20,000 pounds of cost reflected its conviction that the State's
actions were inadequate.
221
Contrast those decisions with the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services.222 In DeShaney the petitioner was beaten and
permanently injured by his father.2 23 Ultimately the father beat the
214. Id.
215. Id. at para. 19.
216. Id. (The government did not contest the fact of a violation of Article 3).
217. Id. at para. 24.
218. Id. at para. 23.
219. Id. at para. 22.
220. Id.
221. Id. at paras. 34, 37.
222. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
223. Id. at 191.
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child so severely that he fell into a life-threatening coma.224
"Emergency brain surgery revealed a series of hemorrhages caused by
traumatic injuries to the head inflicted over a long period of time." 225
Joshua did not die, but suffered such severe injury that "he is expected
to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the profoundly
retarded.",2
26
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the years of
ineffective intervention by the state department of social services
entitled Joshua to a remedy. 2 27 The "Due Process Clauses generally
confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid
may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which
,,228the government itself may not deprive the individual. Since Joshua
was not taken into state custody, the state bore no responsibility for his
safety and general welfare. 229 "While the State may have been aware
of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in
their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable
to them." 23° Under these conditions "the State had no constitutional
duty to protect Joshua. ' 231 "[I]ts failure to do so-though calamitous
in hindsight-simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause."
32
The United States Supreme Court's decision stands in stark
contrast to the European Court of Human Rights decisions which
clearly demand more affirmative duties to act so as to protect children
on the part of the government. Perhaps the grant of certiorari on
November 1, 2004 in the case of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,233
224. Id. at 193.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 197-98.
228. Id. at 196.
229. Id. at 199-01.
230. Id. at 201.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 202 (footnote omitted).
233. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 417 (2004). The result of
DeShaney was effectively reaffirmed, however, by the decision in Town of Castle Rock
v. Gonzales where the Court held the wife had no property interest in seeing the police
enforcement of the protective order. 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005). An amici curiae
brief was filed citing international precedent by the International Law Scholars and
Women's Civil Rights and Human Rights Organizations but none of the Justices
opinions referred to international authority. However, the amici brief did not cite A v.
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suggests willingness to reexamine DeShaney.234 Castle Rock concerns
the failure of the government to take any steps to enforce a domestic
abuse restraining order against the husband. He ignored the order,
abducted the three children of the marriage, killed each and then went
to a police station where he opened fire on the police station with a
semiautomatic weapon, and was himself shot dead. 235
VIII. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS HAS SIMILARLY
INTERPRETED THE RIGHTS TO FAMILY AND PRIVATE LIFE TO ACCORD
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS TO CITIZENS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE.
The rights of the natural father of a child are more protected by
the European Court of Human Rights than by the Supreme Court of the
United States. In Kroon and others v. The Netherlands, the Court
considered the application of Article 8 of the Convention, " 'the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence,' " when the natural father of a child sought
registration by the state as the father of the child.23 6 However, the
government refused to register him as the father because the mother
had been married to another man when she gave birth to the child.
237
Although she obtained a divorce from her husband the following
year, 238according to the registrar of births, only if the former husband
brought proceedings to deny paternity, it was impossible under
Netherlands law to register the natural father as the "legal" father.
239
Three levels of Netherlands courts also rejected the request. 24 0 The
government argued that since the child was born of an extramarital
affair, there was no family between the two.24 1  Moreover, their
United Kingdom. Br. of Intl. L. Scholars & Womens, Civil Rights & Human Rights
Orgs. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents iii-iv (Feb. 9, 2005) (available at
2005 WL 328200).
234. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1099 (10th Cir. 2004).
235. Id. at 1097-98
236. Kroon and others v. The Netherlands, App. No. 18535/91 paras. 10, 28 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Oct. 27, 1994) (available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp 1 97/search.asp?skin=haddock-en (accessed Nov. 26, 2005)).
237. Id. at para. 10.
238. Id. at para. 9.
239. Id. at para. 10.
240. Id. at paras. 11-14. Three more children were also born by the mother and
natural father, although they never married and also did not cohabit. Id. at para. 15.
241. Id. at para. 29.
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subsequent failure to marry and/or live together, as well as the
applicant's failure to contribute to the financial support of the child
242
meant that there was no family life. The applicant argued that he
did spend half his time on the child's care and upbrining and that he
made financial contributions from his modest income.
243
The court ruled that the "notion of 'family life' ... is not confined
to marriage-based relationships and may encompass other de facto
'family ties' where parties are living together .... " However, while
living together ordinarily might be a requirement for a family life, other
factors may demonstrate that a relationship has sufficient consistency
to create de facto" 'family ties,' " such as the four children born to the
same persons in the instant case.
245
According to the principles set out by the Court in its case-law,
where the existence of a family tie with a child has been
established, the State must act in a manner calculated to enable
that tie to be developed and legal safeguards must be established
that render possible as from the moment of birth or as soon as
practicable thereafter the child's integration in his family.
246
According to the Court, " '[R]espect' for 'family life' requires
that biological and social reality prevail over a legal presumption
which, as in the present case, flies in the face of both established fact
and the wishes of those concerned without actually benefiting
anyone. ' 247  While the Court declined to award damages, since it
considered the finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention
sufficient compensation, it did award costs and lawyer's fees.
24 8
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at para. 30 (citation omitted).
245. Id. at para. 30.
A child born of such a relationship is ipso jure part of that "family unit"
from the moment of its birth and by the very fact of it .... There thus
exists between [father and the child] a bond amounting to family life,
whatever the contribution of the latter to his son's care and upbringing.
Id.
246. Id. at para. 32.
247. Id. at para. 40.
248. Id. at paras. 45, 47. The decision was by a vote of 8 to 1 that Article 8 of the
Convention was applicable, and seven to two that it had been violated. Id. at para. 47.
In dissent, the opinion of Judge Mifsud Bonnici emphasized that " 'family life'
necessarily implies 'living together as a family.' " Id. at para. 3 (Bonnici, J.,
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A similar result and holding was reached in Lebbink v.
Netherlands.24 9 Although the father never cohabited with the mother
and child, the ties were that the father was present at the birth, served
as auxiliary guardian until the law creating that position was abolished,
had changed the child's nappy a few times, and had been consulted
about the child's medical problems, which were sufficient to claim
Article 8 protection.
250
Such decisions are at a sharp contrast with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.251 At issue in
that case was a California law that established a presumption that a
child born of the wife is legitimately a child of the marriage, a
presumption rebuttable under only a limited number of
circumstances-not including the instant case. 252  Thus the fact that
blood tests confirmed that Michael H. had a probability of 98.07
percent of being the actual father of the child was irrelevant.2 53 No
constitutional rights of Michael H. were violated!254  According to
Justice Scalia (writing for himself and three other justices) the
dissenting). Forced or coerced living apart would be an accepted exception, but not
when as here the living apart is voluntary. To force the Netherlands to accept as family
life something the parties have willfully opted against is hard to understand. Id.
249. Lebbink v. Netherlands, App. No. 45582/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 1, 2004)
(available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp
?skin=haddock-en (accessed Dec. 25, 2005)). Mere biological kinship without
additional factual or legal elements indicating a close personal relationship was
insufficient to command the protection of Article 8. Id. at para. 37.
250. Id. at paras. 38-39. See also Gorgulu v. Germany, App. No. 74969/01 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Feb. 26, 2004) (available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=haddock-en (accessed Dec. 25,
2005)). The natural father of an illegitimate child sought access to the child but was
barred by judicial decision from access to the child for a year. Id. at paras. 30, 50.
Although the father had never lived with the child (the mother gave the child up for
adoption to foster parents who picked the child up four days after birth), the European
Court of Human Rights held that the year's suspension of access violated article 8 of
the Convention. Id. at paras. 11, 50-51. Severing a child from its roots can only be
justified in very exceptional circumstances. Id. at para. 48. The biological father had
only been permitted to see his child six times for several hours at a time before the
access denial order. Id. at para. 48.
251. MichaelH. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
252. Id. at 113.
253. Id. at 114, 119.
254. Id. at 131-32.
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traditional protection accorded to the family unit was valid as a
historical fact and entitled to judicial attention and deference. 255
Deference to the traditional extended family is not unknown
under the European Convention on Human Rights. For example, in
another case dealing with family life, the Commission by a vote of
fourteen to four, recognized the right of an uncle to be considered
entitled to petition for a child as an aspect of family life.256 While the
case was accepted by the Court, during the interval between the
Commission and Court consideration, the United Kingdom changed the
relevant statutory law to recognize the right of an uncle. 25 7 As a result
the case was dismissed by consent.258
On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights has not
recognized every novel claim of "rights to a family life." In X, Y and Z
v. United Kingdom, the court refused to support the right of a
transsexual (female to male) to be registered as the father of an
artificially inseminated by donor child, despite "his" living in a
permanent relationship with the natural mother of the child for over 13
years.2 59 The Court held unanimously, however, that Article 8 of the
Convention applied to the case, however, found by a vote of fourteen to
six that no violation had occurred.
260
In reaching its determination the Court observed that "no
common European standard" existed with regards to the "granting of
parental rights to transsexuals." 261 The Court further observed that no
trend could be discerned with respect to how social relationships
should be recognized between a child conceived by artificial
insemination and the person who performed the role of a father.262 In
the absence of common ground between the member states of the
Council of Europe, the Court determined that a wide margin of
255. Id. at 124.
256. Boyle v. United Kingdom,, App. No. 16580/90 paras. 14-15 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb.
24, 1994) (available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/
search.asp?skin=haddock-en (accessed Nov. 26, 2005)).
257. Id. at paras. 12, 16.
258. Id. atpara. 18.
259. X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, paras. 12, 15 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1997).
260. Id. at para. 56.
261. Id. atpara. 44.
262. Id.
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appreciation (i.e. deference) should be given to the respondent State. 263
While the Court considered arguments based upon the child's sense of
security (or lack thereof), as well as the practical problems such as
foreign employment that could not be taken up because a lack of
recognition of a dependency relationship had consequences in
immigration and nationality matters as well as benefits, such as free
education and lodging, these were inadequate reasons to justify
overcoming the cautious approach of the nation state.
264
The court concluded its analysis:
[G]iven that transsexuality raises complex scientific, legal, moral
and social issues, in respect of which there is no generally shared
approach among the Contracting States, the Court is of the opinion
that Article 8 cannot, in this context, be taken to imply an
obligation for the respondent State formally to [recognize] as the
father of a child a person who is not the biological father. That
being so, the fact that the law of the United Kingdom does not
allow special legal recognition of the relationship between [the
parties] does not amount to a failure to respect family life within
the meaning of [Article 8].265
In short, the Court would not itself break this new ground in
family law; it would await developments in the member States. Such
an approach is not dissimilar to the cautious approach with which the
United States Supreme Court addresses newly identified "rights."
Indeed, the similarity may suggest that the two constitutional courts are
not all that dissimilar, particularly in confronting one of the most
problematic issues a constitutional court must consider, what are the
appropriate sources for constitutional rights?
263. Id.
264. Id. at paras. 45-48. Inheritance issues could, for example, be settled through the
execution of a will. Id. at para. 48. There was no nationality problem for the instant
child since U.K. citizenship was conferred through the mother. Id. Rare necessities of
producing birth certificates without a father's name was deemed insufficient to produce
particular stigma to the child or family. Id. at para. 49. Nothing restricted the "
'father' " from acting as such in social settings and the father could, with the mother,
apply for a joint residence order which was stated could confer full parental
responsibility for the child under English law. Id. at para. 50.
265. Id. at para. 52.
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IX. THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE AND PRIVATE LIFE INCLUDES NOT
ONLY AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE BLOOD TESTING TO DETERMINE
PATERNITY: THE STATE MUST ASSURE THAT THE PUTATIVE FATHER
SUBMITS TO BLOOD TESTING OR PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
The United States Supreme Court determined in Little v. Streater,
that the State was obliged to provide state-subsidized blood testing for
an indigent defendant in a paternity action.266 The holding resulted
from the State's prominent role in such litigation, particularly
considering that there is a federally mandated program enabling states
to assist indigent mothers in collecting child support payments. 267 The
states, however, are only encouraged to establish such child support
collection programs-they are not required to do so. 26 8 Indeed, the
ultimate issues are between private parties, and ordinarily the Supreme
Court mandates little, if any, obligation on behalf of the state to assist
in such disputes. Thus the holding of Little v. Streater places an
unusual obligation upon the states.
The European Court of Human Rights requires member states to
provide more "active" state assistance to mothers seeking orders
declaring paternity. In Mikulic v. Croatia, the mother and child sought
a declaration of paternity against a putative father.26 9 Ultimately the
court ordered the putative father to provide blood tests, but the man
never appeared for such testing as ordered.27 0 Four years and four
months passed by. 27 1 The mother and child then lodged a complaint
against the government for violations of rights to a family and private
life under Article 8 of the Convention, and the right to a trial in a
reasonable time under Article 6.272
The Court found a violation of the Article 6 right.273 In effect, the
failure to compel the putative father to actually submit to the DNA tests
266. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 3, 16-17 (1981).
267. Id. at 6, 9, l0 n. 6.
268. Id. at I On. 6.
269. Mikulic v. Croatia, App. No. 53176/99 para. 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2002)
(available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp
?skin-haddock-en (accessed Dec. 25, 2005)).
270. Id. at paras. 16-20, 22.
271. Id. at para. 45. Six appointments for DNA tests had been scheduled and fifteen
hearings at the first instance court. Id.
272. Id. at paras. 35, 47.
273. Id. at para. 46.
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violated the mother's and child's rights, particularly the rights to a
"private life" which the Court defined as "a person's physical and
psychological integrity and . . . sometimes embrace[s] aspects of an
individual's physical and social identity." 274 The right to a private life
includes the determination of a legal relationship between a child born
out of wedlock and her father. 27 5 The positive actions required by the
State include the State's obligation to take affirmative action to secure
respect for private life "even in the sphere of the relations of
individuals between themselves . . . ."276 If a member state lacks a
mechanism to compel the putative father to appear for blood testing, it
must provide another method to determine the paternity claim
speedily. 27 In some states the state may fine or imprison the person in
question. In others the failure to appear may create a presumption
of paternity. 279 The failure to have any of these methods to assist
amounts to a failure to have a fair balance between the rights of the
applicant to have her rights determined, and the rights of the supposed
father not to undergo DNA tests.
280
X. THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE PROTECTS THE INTEREST IN THE
FAMILY STAYING TOGETHER, EVEN AGAINST THE INTEREST OF THE
STATE IN DEPORTING NON-CITIZENS
The United States frequently deports aliens who have been
convicted of criminal offenses as provided for by statute. Such
deportations have been severely limited by decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights on the grounds of the right to family life and on
occasion, considerations of equality between the sexes.
In Moustaquim v. Belgium, Belgium sought to deport a Moroccan
national who had lived in Belgium since he was one-year-old.28'
274. Id. at para. 53.
275. Id. at paras. 53, 55.
276. Id. at para. 57.
277. Id. at para. 64.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at para. 65. The Court awarded 7,000 euros in non-pecuniary damage,
holding unanimously that violations of Articles 6 and 8 had been established. Id. at
paras. 78, 80.
281. Moustaquim v. Belgium, App. No. 12313/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802, paras. 9,
17(1991).
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While still a minor, 147 charges of criminal activity had been brought
against him, resulting in ten periods of detention not exceeding fifteen
days.2 82 After Moustaquim became an adult, he was charged with
twenty-six further offenses, and found guilty of twenty of the
offenses. 283  On appeal, the judgment below was set aside and
Moustaquim was found guilty of twenty-two of the offenses, and
prison sentences were ordered of two years plus additional sentences of
eight days and fifteen days. 284 The offenses included aggravated theft,
attempted aggravated theft, theft, handling stolen goods, destroying a
vehicle, assault, and threatening behavior. 28 5  He was acquitted of
indecent assault with violence on an under-age girl over sixteen,
criminal conspiracy, one count of attempted theft, and criminal damage
28628to fencing. He served eighteen months in jail.287
The Ministry of Justice referred Moustaquim's case to the
Advisory Board on Aliens seeking deportation.2 88 That Board found
that although the very large number of offenses that Mr. Moustaquim
had engaged in constituted serious prejudice to public order, and
deportation would be justified in law, but recommended against
deportation. 28 9  The Board considered deportation inappropriate
because of Mr. Moustaquim's youth, both at the time of the offenses
and at the time of its decision, that he had lived in Belgium since he
was one-year-old, his entire family (father, mother and seven other
siblings (four of which were born in Belgium) lived in Belgium, Mr.
Moustaquim was learning his father's trade (a butcher) and was able to
be helped in that endeavor by his father, and the fact of several short
periods of prison leave without any untoward incidents and the
granting of such leave showed some confidence in his behavior.
290
Despite this recommendation, a royal order was served upon Mr.
Moustaquim requiring him to leave Belgium after release from prison
and not to return for ten years.2 9 1 A petition asking the Queen to
282. Id. at para. 10.
283. Id. atparas.13, 14.
284. Id. at paras. 15, 17.
285. Id. at para. 15.
286. Id.
287. Id. at para. 16.
288. Id. atpara. 17.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. atpara. 18.
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intervene was rejected, as were two applications to the Conseil
d'Etat.292 After leaving Belgium Mr. Moustaquim went first to Spain
and then Stockholm where he remained for nearly six years, living at
times legally and other times illegally, by his wits and by taking the
odd undeclared job in various restaurants. 29 3 On December 14, 1989 a
royal order was issued suspending the deportation order for a period of
two years and Mr. Moustaquim returned to Belgium.
294
However, several years previously in 1986, Mr. Moustaquim had
applied under the European Convention of Human Rights alleging that
his deportation infringed upon his rights to family and private life as
well as other provisions of the Convention.29 5 The European Court of
Human Rights held in 1991 by a vote of seven to two that there had
been a breach of Mr. Moustaquim's rights to family life by the
deportation order.2 96  It agreed, thereby, with the Commission of
Human Rights that had reached a similar result, finding that the
deportation was disproportionate as the authorities had not reached a
proper balance between the applicant's interest in maintaining a family
life and the public interest in the prevention of disorder.29 7 The court
considered that all of the offenses related to the period when Mr.
Moustaquim was an adolescent. 2 98 The latest offense on which Mr.
Moustaquim had been convicted dated from December 21, 1980, but
the deportation order was not issued until February 28, 1984. 299 In the
intervening period, which Mr. Moustaquim was in custody for sixteen
months, he also had been at liberty for nearly twenty-three months.
30 0
Mr. Moustaquim had lived in Belgium since he was less than two-
years-old, and had received all of his schooling in French.30 1 He had
returned to Morocco only twice for holidays in the entire period of
twenty years. 30 2  Given that his entire family lived in Belgium, the
292. Id. atparas. 19, 20.
293. Id. at para. 21. He attempted to make a declaration of nationality under
Belgium law, but Belgium authorities rejected that attempt. Id. at para. 22.
294. Id. at para. 25.
295. Id. at para. 30.
296. Id. at para. 59.
297. Id. at paras. 41, 46.
298. Id. at para. 44.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at para. 45.
302. Id.
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Court considered that the deportation order, which the Advisory Board
on Aliens had recommended against, was a serious disruption of his
family life.3 °3 The Court awarded not only costs but also 100,000
Belgian francs for non-pecuniary injury. 304
Nor is this the only case in which family life was seen by the
Court as trumping other serious State interests. For example, in Al-
Nashif and others v. Bulgaria, revocation of a residence permit on the
basis of national security was deemed inappropriate as an infringement
against family life!
30 5
Mr. Al-Nashif was a stateless person of Palestinian origin who
moved to Bulgaria with his wife. 306 Mr. Al-Nashif's brother lived in
Bulgaria and was married to a Bulgarian national. 30 7 Mr. Al-Nashif
was born in Kuwait of a stateless father of Palestinian origin and a
Syrian mother. 308 He lived there until age twenty-five. 3° 9 After the
first Gulf War many Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait, and Al-
Nashif left Kuwait ultimately going to Bulgaria in September 1992.
310
By February 1995 he had obtained a permanent residence permit in
Bulgaria.3  In that same month he contracted a Muslim religious
marriage with a Bulgarian citizen, but under Bulgarian law that
marriage had no legal effect.3 12 Al-Nashif alleged that he continued to
live with his first wife and children, although his "second wife" alleged
that he lived with her. 313 The second wife apparently suffered from a
mental disturbance. 314  In March 1999, the local police in the
Bulgarian town in which Al-Nashif was living proposed that his
residence permit be withdrawn under the Aliens Act which provides for
303. Id.
304. Id. at para. 55. He had asked for 500,000 BEF. Id. at para. 54.
305. Al-Nashif and others v. Bulgaria, App. No. 50963/99 paras. 114-15 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. June 20, 2002).
306. Id. at paras. 9, 11, 13. Subsequently two children were born in Bulgaria of this
marriage. Id. at para. 11.
307. Id. at para. 12.
308. Id. at para. 10. He cannot become a citizen of either Kuwait or Syria since only
offspring of male nationals of each state can become citizens. Id. at para. 10.
309. Id. at para. 11.
310. Id. at para. 13.
311. Id. at para. 15.
312. Id. at para. 16.
313. Id. atpara. 18.
314. Id. at para. 19.
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revocation for "a foreigner who poses a threat to 'the security or the
interests of the Bulgarian State.' ,315 "No further details were
mentioned" and no additional information was given to Mr. Al-Nashif
who was served with an order to leave the country within fifteen
days.3
16
While the authorities gave no further information, two national
newspapers published articles explaining that Mr. Al-Nashif "did not
have permission to teach the Muslim religion, that he had taken part in
an unauthori[z]ed religious seminar in 1997 and that he was linked to
'Muslim Brothers[]' a fundamentalist organi[z]ation." 317 Several local
Muslim leaders in the town A1-Nashif lived in and the Chief Mufti of
the Bulgarian Muslims filed letters with the government supporting Mr.
Al-Nashif.318  They confirmed that he was teaching under their
authorization in full conformity with Bulgarian law. 3 19 The Chief
Mufti stated that the local police had made defamatory statements
about Mr. Al-Nashif, falsely portraying him as a dangerous terrorist
connected to fundamentalist organizations, and that the measures
against Mr. Al-Nashif constituted" 'a demonstration of, and incitement
to, anti-Islamic and xenophobic tendencies.' ,320
Attempts to challenge the deportation order in the Sofia City
Court resulted in an initial order granting a stay of execution of the
order. 32 1 However, days later a certificate was filed stating that Mr.
Al-Nashif" 'had committed acts against the national security and the
interests of the Republic of Bulgaria, consisting in unlawful religious
activity . , ,,322 No further detail was furnished although the initial
determination of the Sophia City Court had indicated that in camera
submissions of the government failed to support the allegation that Mr.
Al-Nashif posed a threat to national security or to the national
interests. 32  That same court, sitting again in camera, reversed its
324previous ruling and permitted the deportation to go forward.
315. Id. atparas. 21-22.
316. Id. atpara. 22.
317. Id. atpara. 23.
318. Id. at para. 24.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. atpara. 38.
322. Id. at para. 39.
323. Id. at para. 38.
324. Id. at para. 40.
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Subsequent to the deportation, on appeal to the Supreme
Administrative Court of Bulgaria, that Court found that the
determination was not subject to appeal and that the decision did not
have to be reasoned.325
Mr. Al-Nashif appealed on behalf of himself and his two children
complaining of violations of the right to family life as well as the
failure to provide an effective remedy under domestic law to challenge
the basis for the deportation order.326 By a vote of four to three both
allegations were sustained by the European Court of Human Rights.
327
The Court determined that notwithstanding the government's
submissions that there was indeed a family life in Bulgaria, even
though the government alleged that Mr. Al-Nashif spent much time
away from the household with his children and despite the "second"
marriage. 32 8 The Court found that from the moment of birth there
exists between a child and his parents a bond amounting to family life
which cannot be broken save in exceptional circumstances. 329 Both
families that are based on marriage and de facto relationships are
entitled to protection.330 A number of factors may be relevant to
determining whether there was a family life including living together,
the length of the relationship, and whether they have demonstrated
their commitment to each other by having children together. 331 In this
case the couple came to Bulgaria as a married couple, lived together,
and bore several children.33 The subsequent religious marriage to
another woman had no legal effect in Bulgaria, and the government
failed to decisively demonstrate that Mr. Al-Nashif ever lived
together. 333  Indeed, the Court was convinced that Mr. Al-Nashif
continued to live with his first wife until he was arrested for purposes
of the deportation.
334
325. Id. at para. 41. Further attempts to litigate in Bulgarian courts resulted in no
further decisions. Id. at paras. 42-43.
326. Id. at paras. 46, 130.
327. Id. at para. 153.
328. Id. at para. 113.
329. Id. at para. 112.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. atpara. 113.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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Both Mr. Al-Nashif and his first wife had established lawful
residence in Bulgaria on the basis of permanent residence permits.
335
Their children were born there, acquired Bulgarian citizenship, and
attended school in Bulgaria.
336
The Court readily found an interference with family life. It then
considered whether the interference with that life was " 'in accordance
with the law,' " and" 'necessary in a democratic society.' "337
The Court determined that" in accordance with the law" required
that the legal basis must be " 'accessible and foreseeable.' ,,338
Foreseeability required that a rule be "formulated with sufficient
precision to enable any individual-if need be with appropriate
advice-to regulate his conduct." 339  The Court admitted that the
"quality of law" criterion, depends to some extent "on the nature and
extent of the interference in question." 340 There was no requirement,
for example, that legal provisions list in detail all conduct that would
justify deportation, since threats may vary in character and be
unanticipated or difficult to define in advance. 34 1  However, the
concepts of lawfulness and rule of law in a democratic society requires
some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body
competent to review the reasons for deportation and relevant
evidence.342 If need be, appropriate procedural limitations may be
taken to safeguard classified information. 343 The individual must be
permitted to challenge the determination; but the independent authority
must be able to determine whether the threat to national security has a
reasonable basis in facts "or reveals an interpretation of 'national
security' that is unlawful or contrary to common sense and
arbitrary."
344
The determination to deport Mr. Al-Nashif was made without
providing any reasons to him at any time, or allowing the testing of
335. Id. at para. 115.
336. Id.
337. Id. at para. 116.
338. Id. at para. 119.
339. Id.
340. Id. at para. 121 (citation omitted).
341. Id.
342. Id. atpara. 123.
343. Id.
344. Id. at para. 124.
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such reasons in any independent tribunal competent to examine the
matter. 345 The Court observed that various judges and members of the
Bulgarian parliament, including half of the judges on the Constitutional
Court of Bulgaria, expressed opinions that the practice violated the
Bulgarian Constitution as well as the Convention.346 In short, the
Court found that the deportation failed to provide adequate protection
against arbitrariness.
347
The Court further found that Bulgarian law, insofar as it permitted
deportation based upon " 'national security' " as its justification, need
not state reasons and are not subject to appeal, violated Article 13 of
the Convention, i.e. deprived individuals of an effective remedy against
violations of the Convention.348 The Court stated:
While procedural restrictions may be necessary to ensure that no
leakage detrimental to national security would occur and while
any independent authority dealing with an appeal against a
deportation decision may need to afford a wide margin of
appreciation to the executive in matters of national security, that
can by no means justify doing away with remedies altogether
whenever the executive has chosen to invoke the term "national
security."
3 49
Reasons grounding the deportation decision must be provided and
the independent tribunal must be competent to reject the government's
assertions that deportation is necessary where it finds it arbitrary or
unreasonable. Some form of adversarial testing is required, if need be
through a special representative after a security clearance. 35 0 The
Court also awarded non-pecuniary damages to Mr. Al-Nashif of 7,000
euro and 5,000 euro to each of his children, as well as costs and
expenses.
35 1
Thus, the rights to family life and to legal regularity conjoin to
require testing of even "national security" actions. It is worth
comparing this 2002 decision with the 2004 decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld requiring that hearings be
345. Id. at para. 126.
346. Id. at para. 127.
347. Id. atpara. 128.
348. Id. atparas. 135, 138.
349. Id. at para. 137 (citation omitted).
350. Id.
351. Id. atparas. 148, 152.
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provided to detainees at Guantanamo Bay to contest the factual basis
for the detention before a neutral decision maker. 352 The Court stated:
"We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual
basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."
353
The European Court of Human Rights and the United States
Supreme Court are thus not that dissimilar in the area of one of the
most important rights, "the most elemental of liberty interests-the
interest in being free from physical detention by one's own
government."
354
However, a country is not required to allow a family to reunite
inside its borders if its generally applicable immigration laws would
prohibit such joining. At the same time, the Convention requires the
principle of equality on the basis of gender to be applied so that a
country does not prefer one gender over another in such immigration
laws.
In the case of Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, three married women
in the United Kingdom sought permission for their husbands to join
them in the United Kingdom.355  All were denied, although in a
comparable situation, were the husbands the ones in the United
Kingdom, the wives would have been granted immigration
permission.3
56
By a unanimous vote, the Commission determined that there had
been a violation of Article 14 (gender equality) of the Convention in
conjunction with Article 8 (right to family life).357 The Court held that
Article 8 had not been violated in itself, but that it in combination with
Article 14 had been violated.358
The Court determined that each of the applicants made out a case
that family life had been implicated.359 It also considered, unlike the
Commission, that it should determine whether Article 8 had been
352. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
353. Id. at 2648.
354. Id. at 2646.
355. Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 10 (1985).
356. Id. at para. 74.
357. Id. at para. 56.
358. Id. at para. 100.
359. Id. at para. 65.
Vol. 27
HeinOnline  -- 27 Whittier L. Rev.  402 2005-2006
MESSAGES FROM STRASBOURG
violated.360 This was seen as a difficult question, one in which a wide
margin of appreciation is appropriate for the policies of the contracting
parties. 361 The issue is commixed with not only issues of family life,
but also immigration and the well recognized right that a state has, in
international law, to control the entries of non-nationals into its
territory. 362 None of the applicants in the instant case had formed a
family before coming to the United Kingdom; indeed, in each instance
the marriage occurred after the women had entered the United
Kingdom.3 63 Nor did any of the applicants demonstrate why they
would have special difficulty in establishing family life in their own or
husband's respective countries. 364 The Court then concluded that no "
'lack of respect' for family life" was revealed in the facts of the
case.
36 5
On the other hand, taking Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14,
the Court reached the opposite conclusion. The Court examined each
of the three grounds advanced by the women: Sex, race, and on the
366ground of birth. Each was analyzed in relationship to the interest
advanced by the government to justify a difference in treatment
between bringing wives to the United Kingdom and bringing husbands
to the United Kingdom.
With respect to sex, the government asserted it was trying to
regulate " 'primary immi ration,' " and was justified to protect the
domestic labor market. 3 7'  The government relied on statistics
demonstrating the likelihood that men were more likely than women to
be working.36 8  The women minimized the utility of statistics,
deprecated the government's ignoring the modern role of women, and
also asserted that men may be self-employed, thus creating rather than
360. Id.
361. Id. at para. 67.
362. Id.
363. Id. at para. 68.
364. Id. (Pointing out that two of the women knew explicitly at the time of the
marriage that permission would probably be refused, and that the third woman, who
had never cohabited with her husband in the U.K. should have known that permission
would be required and that under the rules in force at that time it would probably be
refused.).
365. Id. at para. 69.
366. Id. at para. 70.
367. Id. at para. 75.
368. Id.
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seeking jobs.3 69 The government also advanced an argument based on
domestic tranquility, to which the applicants rejoined was a
justification based upon racial prejudice. 37 Each of these reasons had
been rejected by the Commission, which minimized the annual
reduction in immigration (2,000), considering it not of sufficient size or
importance to justify a difference based upon gender. 371 Moreover, the
Commission viewed that race relations might be exacerbated by the
rules, rather than assisted.372  Before the Court, the Commission's
representative indicated that a revised figure newly submitted by the
government of 5,700 per annum, would not have changed the result in
the Commission.373 While the aim of protecting the domestic labor
market was considered significant by the Court, that in itself did not
justify the difference in treatment based upon gender.374 Only "very
weighty reasons" could justify such a difference. 375 In the Court's
view, the government's arguments were not convincing. 376  In
particular, at the time of the adoption of the rules in question, "
'economically active' " status included many immigrant wives, who at
that time already outnumbered by far immigrant husbands.
377
Whatever differences there may be, the Court was unconvinced that
they were sufficiently important to justify the different treatment.378
Nor was the Court persuaded that domestic tranquility was aided by the
rules. 379  Lastly, the Court rejected an argument presented by the
government that it had acted more generously than required in its
policy allowing wives to join their husbands.380  Such an argument
ignores the general equality command, demanding equality of
369. Id.
370. Id. at para. 76.
371. Id. atpara. 77.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at para. 78.
375. Id.
376. Id. at para. 79.
377. Id. (Even thought many of these economically active women were engaged in
part time work, being economically active does not necessarily mean one is seeking to
be employed by someone else.).
378. Id.
379. Id. atpara. 81.
380. Id. at para. 82.
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treatment even though particular treatment is not commanded by the
Convention.
3 8 1
That decision stands is square opposition to a decision by the
United States Supreme Court in Nguyen v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service.38 2 In Nguyen the Supreme Court held that the
equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment was not violated by
an immigration statute that made it more difficult for a child born out
of wedlock abroad to claim citizenship if the citizen parent was a
father, not a mother.383 The petitioner, Tuan Anh Nguyen was born in
1969 in Saigon, Vietnam to an American father and a Vietnamese
mother.384 The father never married Tuan's mother.385 For a time
after his birth, Tuan lived with his father's new girlfriend in
Vietnam. 3 86  When he was six, Tuan came to the United States,
becoming a lawful permanent resident raised by his father in Texas.
387
When he was twenty-two-years-old, Tuan pleaded guilty to two counts
of sexual assault on a child, and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service initiated deportation proceedings against him as an alien who
had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, as well as
an aggravated felony. 38 8 He was found deportable, but appealed the
determination. 389 While the appeal was pending, his father obtained an
order of paternity from a state court based on DNA testing. 39  By that
time, Nguyen was twenty-eight-years-old, but his claim to citizenship
was denied based upon failure of his father to comply with a federal
requirement that the father agree to provide financial support prior to
the age of eighteen, and establish paternity through various methods
prior to the child turning eighteen.39 1 Federal statutes do not impose
such requirements upon the children of citizen mothers who are born
abroad. The Court rejected an equal protection attack on the
381. Id.
382. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
383. Id. at 56-59.
384. Id. at 57.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 57-58 (based upon 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g) and 1409(a)(1-4) (2000)).
392. Id. at 59-60 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c), " 'if the mother had the nationality of
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differential classification, rejecting any requirement that Congress must
accord respect to DNA testing in lieu of other methods of establishing
paternity.39 3 The Court also relied upon the government's interest in
ensuring that a meaningful relationship existed between the parent and
314the child. The Court cited statistics indicating that the average
American traveling overseas spent 15.1 nights out of the country in
1999.395 In the mind of the majority this "reality" demonstrated the
critical importance of the government making certain that there be
some opportunity to ensure a tie between the citizen father and the
396foreign-born child. The Court then considered that the statutory list
of methods of evidencing such a tie before age eighteen are reasonable
means of making such a determination. 397
The four dissenters considered that the Court's decision
inappropriately applied prior precedents involving heightened scrutiny
to gender based classifications, and in particular failed to demand an "
'exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification.' "398 The
dissenters asserted that at the bottom, the requirement of a real practical
relationship embodied in section 1409(a)(4) "finds support not in
biological differences but instead in a stereotype-i.e., 'the
generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers..
to develop caring relationships with their children.' "399
Nguyen was thus subject to deportation although he had lived in
the United States since the age of six, was over thirty-on years of age
by the time of the Supreme Court decision and was indisputably the
child of an American father whom he had lived with since birth. Not
only does this decision ignore the decision in Abdulaziz, it also ignores
the holding of the European Court of Human Rights in Moustaquim v.
Belgium, considered above.
the United States ...and ...physically present in the United States or one of its
outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year' ").
393. Id. at 63-64.
394. Id. at 64-65.
395. Id. at 66.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 68-69.
398. Id. at 74-75 (O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer. JJ., dissenting).
399. Id. at 88-89.
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XI. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND A PRIVATE LIFE: PROTECTION OF THE
HOME AND OFFICE FROM TELEPHONE MONITORING AND OFFICIAL
SEARCHES
Article 8 of the European Convention protects the right to privacy
and private life, as well as the right to family life. 40 0 The right to
private life explicitly encompasses the home: "Everyone has the right
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. ' 4° 1  However, the Convention has been held
applicable to business premises as well. For example, the right to
privacy includes within its protection an attorney's office as was the
case in Niemetz v. Germany.
4 02
In extending the protection of the right to private life to an office,
the Court advanced several justifications. First, the French text of the
Convention employed the word " 'domicile,' " which in French has a
broader connotation than the word " 'home.' ,,403 Second, it is
impossible to ensure that work is only done in an office, it may be done
at home.4 04  A narrow interpretation might generate inequality in
application. 405 Third, and more generally, interpretation of the words"
'private life' " and " 'home' " more broadly would be more consonant
with the essential object or purpose of Article 8-to protect the
individual against arbitrary interference with private life by public
authorities.4 56 Lastly, the Court determined that in this particular case,
the warrant issued was unlimited as to its definition of documents,
resulting in the search examining four cabinets concerning clients as
well as six individual files-thereby covering "correspondence," a term
not limited by Article 8 by any adjective.40 7
While in this particular case, the Court determined that the search
had been in technical compliance with the legal requirements, 4 08 and
400. The European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, cl. 1 (Jan. 20, 1966),
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html (accessed Dec. 19, 2005).
401. Id.
402. Niemetz v. Germany, 251-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 59 (1992).
403. Id. at para. 30.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at para. 31.
407. Id. at para. 32.
408. Id. at paras. 34-35.
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had a legitimate aim, 409 the interference was not " 'necessary in a
democratic society.' ,410 However, while the Court deemed the reason
for the search a substantial one, the failure to limit the search,
particularly the search of a lawyer's office, by any procedural
safeguards, and the impact upon professional secrecy, was deemed an
encroachment on the rights to a fair trial under Article 6 of the
Convention.
4 11
However, not only are private attorneys entitled to respect of their
"private life" while on their office premises; an Assistant Chief
Constable is also entitled toprivacy, even in telephone calls from her
office as well as her home. 4 1 Halford v. United Kingdom held that the
requirement that any interference with a person's private life and
correspondence be in accordance with domestic law as well as the rule
of law. 413 A total absence of regulation over the circumstances and
conditions under which covert surveillance and interception of
communications were conducted meant that Articles 8 and 13
(effective remedy) of the Convention had been violated.414 Pecuniary
damages of 10,600 British pounds were awarded along with costs and
expenses of 25,000 British pounds.415
The requirement that surveillance be in accordance with law has
been repeatedly applied by the European Court of Human Rights. For
example, in Malone v. United Kingdom, during a trial for offenses
relating to the handling of stolen goods, it was revealed that the
defendant's telephone calls had been monitored by the police pursuant
to a warrant of the Secretary of State.4 16 Although several trials
resulted in acquittals on all charges, an application to the European
Court of Human Rights resulted in a holding that the Article 8 rights to
private life of the accused had been violated.417
409. Id. at para. 36.
410. Id. at para. 37.
411. Id. (The Court mentioned one such safeguard might have been the presence of
an independent observer during the search.).
412. Halford v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20605/92, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 523, para.
68 (1997).
413. Id. atpara. 49.
414. Id. at paras. 49, 83.
415. Id. at paras. 74-83 (pecuniary loss and legal costs and expenses).
416. Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, para. 14
(1997).
417. Id. at para. 80.
Vol. 27
HeinOnline  -- 27 Whittier L. Rev.  408 2005-2006
MESSAGES FROM STRASBOURG
In the opinion of the Court, the law of England and Wales does
not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of
exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public
authorities. To that extent, the minimum degree of legal
protection to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law in a
democratic society is lacking.
4 18
The essential difficulty for the Court was that the powers to
intercept were neither incorporated into legal rules nor were limitations
of the discretion of the executive enacted in rules.
4 19
Similarly French law failed to provide with reasonable clarity the
scope and manner under which wiretapping and other forms of
interception of telephone communications could be seized, and even
though little or no harm resulted from such seizures in the instant case,
the right to private life had been violated.42°
Moreover, failure to comply with national law in wiretapping,
when the police supplied a private citizen with taping equipment and
instruction on how to operate the machine, in order to gather evidence
of sexual advances by an attorney (for which the attorney was
convicted), violated the attorney's right to private life under Article
8.42
1
Such decisions might be looked to for suggestions as to possible
remedies a court might award when constitutional rights have been
violated, but harm is absent or difficult to demonstrate. Even awards of
legal fees and costs might serve as a modest deterrent to poorly
designed surveillance and warrant procedures.
418. Id. atpara. 79.
419. Id. Perhaps the latter point particularly concerned the court since an official
governmental report had described the Secretary of State's discretion as absolute, albeit
in practice limited, but failed to specify how it was limited. Id. at para. 75.
420. Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528, para. 35 (1990).
421. M.M v. The Netherlands, App. No. 39339/98 paras. 13, 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr.
8, 2003) (available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
(accessed Dec. 25, 2005)). The applicant made no request for damages from the Court,
but did request attorney's fees and expenses, and was awarded 10,000 euro. Id. at
paras. 48, 55.
2005
HeinOnline  -- 27 Whittier L. Rev.  409 2005-2006
WHITTIER LAW REVIEW
XII. IS THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AN ADEQUATE REMEDY TO
TEST THE RIGHT TO DETAIN AN INDIVIDUAL?
In an otherwise unremarkable Grand Chamber decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in 1981, the Court found the English
remedy of habeas corpus inadequate to test the legitimacy of detention
of a mental health patient. 422 By the time of the decision, it meant
nothing to X, for he had passed away, but the precedent is worth
reflecting upon in light of the enormous restrictions on the
effectiveness of the writ of habeas corpus in the United States as a
result of both judicial decisions limiting the writ as well as a result of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.423
X's detention originally dated to his assault of a fellow worker
with a spanner (wrench).424  He pled guilty and after medical
examination was detained at Broadmore Hospital, a special secure
hospital for the criminally insane. 425 After detention for several years
he was conditionally discharged, on conditions that included residence
in the matrimonial home. After several years of such release, his
wife visited the probation officer and informed him that X remained
deluded, and threatening, using obscene language, accused her of loose
morals, and drinking quite heavily.42 7  She informed the probation
officer she intended to leave her husband the following day.4 28 That
same afternoon, X was once again taken into custody by the police and
returned to Broadmore Hospital.429
While there was some dispute about the matter, X maintained that
he was never informed about the basis for readmission, although he
inferred it had something to do with complaints from his wife.43 0 Over
the next years, X sought to challenge the readmission through several
legal routes, including the common law writ of habeas corpus. 43 1 No
422. Xv. United Kingdom, App. No. 6998/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 188, para. 58 (1981).
423. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in various sections of 8,
18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
424. X, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 20.
425. Id. atpara. 20-21.
426. Id. at para. 21.
427. Id. at para. 23.
428. Id.
429. Id. at para. 24.
430. Id. at para. 25.
431. Id. at paras. 26-30.
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challenge was successful, although several years later he was released
again on a conditional discharge.
Meanwhile, X had challenged his readmission under the
European Convention on Human Rights.4 33 He complained that he
was re-detained without any legal proceedings, without any
examination by physicians and complained that habeas corpus
proceedings did not fully investigate the merits of the decision to recall
him, but only examined if the recall had been ordered in accordance
with statutory provisions.
434
The European Court of Human Rights had no difficulty
determining that the emergency recall procedures were permissible in
that they were in accordance with procedures prescribed by law, and
were thus "lawful" in the sense of conformity with domestic law.
435
However, the claim regarding the inadequacy of the remedy of
habeas corpus received quite different treatment. The remedy of
habeas corpus was described as inquiring into whether the detention is
in compliance with the requirements stated in the relevant legislation
and the applicable principles of the common law.4 36 Subject to these
principles a decision even if technically legal on its face may be upset,
inter alia, if the detaining authority misused its powers by acting in bad
faith or capriciously or for a wrongful purpose, or if the decision is
supported by no sufficient evidence or is one which no reasonable
person could have reached in the circumstances. 437 Subject to the
foregoing, the Court will not review the grounds or merits of a decision
taken by or on administrative authority to the extent that these are
exclusively a matter for determination by that authority. 438  In
particular, when the terms of the relevant statute affords the
administrator discretion, whether broad or narrow, habeas review will
focus solely on the conformity of that discretion with the statute.
439
432. Id. at para. 30.
433. Id. at para. 31.
434. Id.
435. Id. at paras. 41-42.
436. Id. at para. 56.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
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In the Court's view, such review was inadequate to justify
continuing confinement of X.440 Such review must be wide enough to
bear on the merits of the lawful detention of the person, especially in
the instant case on whether the reasons capable of justifying the initial
detention may have ceased to exist. 44 1 "This means that in the instant
case, [Article 5 (right to liberty) of the Convention] required an
appropriate procedure allowing a court to examine whether the
patient's disorder still persisted and whether the Home Secretary was
entitled to think that a continuation of the compulsory confinement was
necessary in the interests of public safety.""44  In short, the reviewing
tribunal must to some extent be permitted to decide the merits of the
detention, not just the technical "lawfulness" in the sense of
compliance with procedural substance.
Consequently, the Court unanimously held that there had been a
breach of the Convention. 443  A holding that habeas corpus to be
adequate must not only check procedural compliance but also the
substantive merit of the underlying ground for detention would mark a
sharp break from precedents in the United States.
Federal court deference to state court determinations of
substantive constitutional procedural issues would appear suspect
under such treatment. Moreover, the ultimate basis for detention, in the
sense of guilt or innocence would also appear open to review under a
"broader writ of habeas corpus." Indeed, many provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 might be
suspect under the analysis of the European Court of Human Rights.
4 44
XIII. CONCLUSION
The European Court of Human Rights has rendered an enormous
number of human rights decisions over its short existence, more than
440. Id. at para. 58.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at para. 67.
444. See Ronn Gehring, Tyler v. Cain: A Fork in the Path for Habeas Corpus or the
End of the Road for Collateral Review? 36 Akron L. Rev. 181 (2002) (which discusses,
inter alia, the gatekeeper provisions of AEDPA, the time limitations for initiating
habeas review (one year after direct appeal ended), as well as retroactivity as
interpreted in Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) and the earlier decision in Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
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3600 decisions to date, increasing by 700 or more decisions a year. If
the United States Supreme Court only issued opinions in similar cases,
it would take nearly fifty years to match the output of the European
Court. It appears not only sensible, but appropriate for United States
courts and lawyers to examine this enormous body of case precedents
for ideas and suggestions on appropriate responses to new as well as
old issues. When such case law is so readily available on free web
sites as well as computer data bases such as Lexis, an attorney who
ignores this body of law may be doing a disservice to his or her clients,
and more importantly, to the future development of United States law.
Moreover, the March 1, 2005 decision of the Supreme Court
invalidating the juvenile death penalty in the United States, Roper v.
Simmons, indicates that the Supreme Court will continue to pay
attention to international authorities, citing inter alia, the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on
Human Rights, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child.4
5
This article merely scratches the surface of some of these
decisions. The future use of such decisions is limited only by the
creativity of American and European lawyers and judges.
Other matters of substance that have been considered by the
European Court of Human Rights include:
Is "don't ask, don't tell," a constitutional principle?
446
What constitutional rules apply to surveillance of mail, post, and
telecommunications for national security purposes?
44 7
Is extradition permissible when the woman involved may be
subjected to stoning to death for adultery? 44 8
What rights does the father of an illegitimate child have to
visitation of his child?
449
445. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1199 (2005).
446. Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96 para. 2
(Eur. Ct. H.R. July 25, 2000).
447. Klass and others v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 2 (1978).
448. See Jabari v. Turkey, App. No. 40035/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 10, 2000).
449. Lebbink v. Netherlands, App. No. 45582/99 para. 32 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 1,
2004).
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Does a husband have a valid claim against prosecution for
assisted suicide for his terminally ill wife?
450
Does an injunction against newspaper publication of a story about
thalidomide and the proposed settlement discussions with the drug
manufacturers violate the right to a free press?
451
450. Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02 para. 14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 29,
2002).
451. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 44 (1979).
Vol. 27
HeinOnline  -- 27 Whittier L. Rev.  414 2005-2006
